Category Archives: Media

Bradley Bosserman Discusses Syria on Latest Episode of Debrief

TheRiskyShift

In the latest episode of Debrief  from The Risk Shift, NDN’s Bradley Bosserman sits down with James Sheehan to discuss the ongoing conflict in Syria. James and Brad explore the role that the US can play in rebuilding Syria along with the significance of chemical weapons and the influence of extremist organizations.click_to_play

Founded in January 2012, TheRiskyShift.com (TRS) bridges the gap between academia and journalism: it provides the depth that is often missing from today’s media whilst remaining open and accessible to those who are not familiar with academic debate on the subjects at hand. A diverse roster of columnists contribute, with international relations theorists, political scientists, historians and philosophers present. The majority of TRS’ writers are graduate students from academic institutions within the UK and abroad, complimented by current and former think tank employees, journalists, and analysts.

Middle East Engagement Briefing – “A Real Opportunity to Lead”

Bradley Bosserman hosted an interactive webcast on framing a more robust Middle East strategy. This previously unpublished briefing deck highlights some of the latest market research and polling from the United States and abroad, detailing political opportunities and framing mechanics that can successfully support a strategy of broader economic engagement with the Middle East and North Africa.

China’s Power Plays in the Middle East

Jerusalem PostThe Jerusalem Post published an in-depth piece this week analyzing the changing oil geopolitics of the Middle East. Political Editor Ilan Evyatar takes a look at the implications of demand for Middle East oil shifting dramatically over the next few decades from the West to the East. I argue that the US should remain engaged in the region based on a broader economic and strategic relationship in order to counter-balance rising Chinese influence, given Beijing’s track record in the rest of Africa. This entire dynamic is going to be extremely important to medium-term regional politics and there is not nearly enough discussion about this reality here in Washington. The article is excerpted below and I encourage you to read the full piece. 

WHILE THERE appears to be a consensus that China’s rapidly growing energy needs mean it will need to nurture a stable environment and adopt a more proactive foreign policy in the region, not everyone shares Biran’s far reaching vision of a Pax Sinica.

“Surging Chinese demand for energy resources over the next several decades will make their more prominent role in the Middle East inevitable. China is now second only to the United States in consumption and importation of oil, a trend that will only continue as the Chinese continue to urbanize their population and bring millions more cars on line. No country can afford to remain uninterested in a region that it will be so dependent upon,” says Bradley Bosserman, a foreign policy analyst and director of the Middle East program at the NDN New Policy Institute, a center-left Washington think tank.

Bosserman, however, cautions that there has been consistent divergence between the US and China on regional issues, from Iran to Syria and elsewhere. “While a peaceful and agreed-upon settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute would contribute to regional stability, China has never shown much interest in investing diplomatic energy… in other parts of the world where it had economic interests.”

He points to the potential lessons to be learned from China’s engagement in Africa, and warns that while the optimists may believe that China’s growing energy interdependence with the Middle East will lead to Beijing becoming more interested in productive diplomatic engagement, its record in Africa gives “little indication that it will pursue that path.”

“For the past half-century,” says Bosserman, “China’s policy of non-interference has provided capital and investment to corrupt governments who have been more than happy to avoid the complicated work of economic and political reform that is often demanded by the United States and Europe. Throughout Africa, China has consistently valued preferential trading terms, lopsided leasing deals, and short-term profits over the kinds of lasting investments in good governance, political reconciliation, and poverty alleviation that lay the groundwork for real stability. It seems more likely that it is that model that they will try to export to the Middle East rather than some other idealized version.”

New Essay on Hagel’s Nomination

policymicI published an essay today analyzing the pockets of resistance to Chuck Hagel’s nomination to serve as Secretary of Defense. Later this week he will make his case to his former colleagues on the Hill while a handful of shadowy groups make big ad buys attempting to smear him. In this essay, which originally appeared at PolicyMic,  I tackle some of the context.

Long-time Republican Senator Chuck Hagel is set to testify before his former colleagues this week in order to secure their consent to serve as President Obama’s new secretary of defense. Despite Hagel’s long tenure as a respected voice on national security issues and his credentials as a decorated war hero, his nomination has not been without controversy. Shortly after his name was leaked, he was attacked for being insufficiently supportive of Israel, too soft on Iran, and too supportive of constraining the defense budget.

The Israel hawks on the Democratic side of the aisle are likely to fall in line after Senator Schumer offered his seal of approval and AIPAC decided to take a back seat. But some Republicans — both naked partisans and neoconservative ideologues — have decided to saddle up and go to war over Hagel’s nomination.

A shadowy but well heeled group called Americans for a Strong Defense has recently been formed and has declared their intention to make a major ad buy in at least five states indicting Hagel’s “out-of-the-mainstream” views and calling on the Senators in those states to reject his nomination. Hagel’s views, though, are eminently mainstream, as judged by the opinions of both the public and the foreign affairs establishment. What’s really happening is that opposition is coming largely from a small but vocal group of right-wing neoconservatives, whose rise and subsequent fall after the last Bush administration have left them terrified of becoming permanently marginalized.

Polling indicates that a plurality of Americans believe that the current level and nature of U.S. support for Israel is appropriate. Hagel’s reticence about pursuing an unnecessary military confrontation with Iran is a view shared by the American people in addition to the Israeli defense and intelligence community. And as for the defense budget? The public, the Joint Chiefs, and the majority of the foreign policy establishment all publicly share his and the president’s opinion that real and reasonable reductions in the growth of Pentagon spending can be achieved without compromising U.S. national security.

In many ways, the most bipartisan and popular foreign policy position in America today is support for Obama’s campaign to unwind the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a patent rejection of the two enterprises which now stand as the most high-profile symbols of modern neoconservative adventurism. The attacks on Chuck Hagel are not coming from people who believe he is outside of the mainstream. They are coming from neocons who fear that his nomination lays bare the shortsightedness of their neoconservative ideology and threatens their monopoly on defining strong national security strategy. It is Americans for a Strong Defense who are now outside the mainstream, not Chuck Hagel. And they are absolutely terrified of obsolescence.

Bradley Bosserman is a foreign policy analyst at NDN and the New Policy Institute where he Directs the Middle East and North Africa Initiative. He lives on twitter as @BradEEB

New Op-Ed on Preparing for Syria’s Transition

Bradley Bosserman, Director of NDN’s MENA Initiative, published an article arguing that the US and international community need to do more to prepare for a post-Assad Syria. The essay was published by Syria Deeply, a recently launched news and analysis platform designed to illuminate the complex issues of the Syrian crisis through on the ground reporting and in-depth expert commentary.

Don’t Wait for Assad’s Fall to Prepare for Transition Syria News

Much of the latest analysis of the ongoing crisis in Syria focuses on securing the Assad regime’s stockpile of chemical weapons. In particular, how to keep them out of the hands of groups like the Nusra Front. While that is critical, the more difficult, and no less important, consideration for policymakers should be preparing a real strategy for a post-Assad transition. It’s in U.S.interest to see the creation of a free and stable Syria that promotes regional security. But the time to put the pieces in place that can enable that is not the day after Assad falls. The time is now.

Post-Assad Syria will be messy and awash with weapons. Those involved in the transition should learn the lessons of de-Baathification–the U.S.-led process in Iraq that disassembled all institutions of Saddam Hussein’s regime, creating a destabilizing vacuum. In Syria, maintaining as much continuity of key institutions —especially within the military and security apparatus—will be critical to avoiding a disaster. Meanwhile, the Supreme Military Council, the military wing of the Syrian opposition, will not be equipped to effectively manage reconstruction and the distribution of aid in the immediate aftermath of Assad’s downfall. That is why the new government should invite an international stabilization force into the country with a temporary mandate of peace enforcement.

Frederic Hof, former Special Advisor for Transition in Syria, suggests that such a force would “protect vulnerable populations, expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance, provide law and order and suppress, with deadly force, extremists and stay-behind regime elements.” It would also be able to minimize the bloodletting of Alawites and regime collaborators. More importantly, it would help maintain stability on the ground, which would allow the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) to undertake the important work of establishing political and governing institutions and crafting a real time-horizon for the implementation of constitutional and parliamentary processes. However, as Ambassador Hof admits, it is not intuitively clear under which auspices this force would be formed, who would contribute troops, and from where the funding would come. These are conversations that need to occur now. If serious preparations do not begin until Assad falls, it will be impossible to respond quickly enough to achieve the goal of stabilization.

The recent experiences in North Africa make clear that political processes and security are not sufficient to ensure a successful transition. Reconstruction, political transition, and humanitarian aid are all crucial, but costly endeavors. Unfortunately, the international community has not yet come to terms with how this work will be funded. Yaser Tabbara, a Syrian-American member of the opposition, explains that the SOC has conducted studies that reveal the “cost of the management of the liberated areas” to be “close to the neighborhood of $500 million a month”. The largest donation thus far has been a commitment from Saudi Arabia of $100 million.

But even Tabbara’s estimates are woefully low. In reality, a successful Syrian transition will cost billions of dollars. If the United States and the international community wish to see the formation of a democratic, stable, and secure country, they need to plan now for funding the transition. Ambassador Hof has called upon Friends of Syria, the group of over 100 countries supporting the opposition, to act immediately to create an interim reconstruction fund. “It could take The World Bank and other international financial institutions months to do needs assessments, organize pledging sessions, and the rest,” he says. The piecemeal and insufficient funding of transitions in Libya,Egypt, and Tunisia are prime examples of the problems presented by financial support policies that are slapped together after the fact.

The Deauville Partnership, an international framework to coordinate aid to the transition countries, was created in May 2011 and involves the U.S., the E.U., and key Gulf States. This partnership serves a laudable coordination function and has mobilized billions of dollars worth of support, but simply rolling Syriainto that framework at this stage is probably a bad idea. Not only is the Deauville money already spoken for, but bureaucratic constraints have prevented much of it from actually flowing to the intended countries, even long after autocratic governments were toppled. A report by The Atlantic Council concludes that “a clear accounting of exactly what has been transferred to partnership countries is difficult to ascertain, particularly since there is a tendency to double-count funding or re-package initiatives under the Deauville banner that were already in the works.”

Another problem with just adding Syria to the Deauvillewait-list is that the funding is conditioned upon moving toward democratization objectives and economic reform. Those are important considerations for Libya,Egypt, and Tunisia, which are well into their transitions. While Syria will hopefully be a good candidate for that process before too long,Damascus will need large amounts of funding immediately to simply avert a humanitarian disaster. Right now, the country faces a real possibility that Assad’s fall will create tens of thousands of refugees, destabilize the region, and create a comfortable home for dangerous extremist groups. The international community cannot afford to wait for a perfectly democratic government or constitution in the days, weeks, and months that will follow the ouster of the regime.

While it is impossible to know exactly when or how the Assad regime will collapse, it now appears inevitable that it will. When that occurs, the United States and the international community need to be prepared to answer the call for real assistance. The institutions and tools that everyone knows will be needed must be planned for now. There are fighters outside Aleppo and Damascus giving their lives each day in a grueling battle for a free Syria. Those wishing to support them need to make sure that the tools to build that new country will be ready when those brave revolutionaries call for them.

Brad Bosserman Quoted in The Hill

Menendez ArticleThe Hill ran an article this morning examining the potential policy implications of Senator Kerry moving to the helm of the State Department and Senator Menendez, then, taking the Senate Foreign Relations gavel. I’m quoted discussing their divergent approaches to Iran.

Bradley Bosserman, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program for the liberal think tank NDN, said Obama and Kerry “know that productively engaging our European and Asian allies in a global campaign to isolate Tehran economically and diplomatically is the best policy.”

“There are others, though, who believe that an endless series of new, supposedly tougher sanctions is the best way to appear ‘strong on Iran,’ ” he said. “Sen. Menendez has demonstrated an enthusiasm for leading this group and has shown no apprehension about publicly clashing with the administration over the issue. The problem … is that their zeal to look tough discounts the realities of implementing complex sanction regimes that are coordinated with our allies — countries with diverse and distinct abilities to quickly comply with new sanctions.”

[Read the full article here]

Huff Post Live Segment on Benghazi Hearings

I appeared on Mike Sacks’ show this morning to discuss the Congressional hearings investigating the Benghazi consulate attack. I think these closed-door hearings are a good idea and should be used as an opportunity to analyze the bureaucratic and strategic decisions that were made in the days and months prior to the attack, in hopes of improving our processes. If mistakes were made, they should be addressed in a forthright and non-political way. Though Congress has often chosen to abrogate its foreign policy oversight functions, I welcome the renewed interest as long as its constructive and policy-driven. While there is always a desire by the press to know more details, much of the substance of these hearings will center on or involve diplomatic security procedures, military and intelligence assets, ongoing counter-terrorism operations, and covert actions. These are all topics that are classified for very good reason, and should remain behind closed doors. I’ll also note that front-line diplomatic work in unstable environments is inherently dangerous. Our diplomats understand that. And while we have a responsibility to take all reasonable security precautions, the fact that something horrible happened does not necessarily mean that someone screwed up.

Click the image below to view the segment. 

Discussing Iran Sanctions On HuffPostLive

I was on HuffPostLive this morning with Abby Huntsman to discuss the latest round of European sanctions on Iran and the general efficacy of the sanctions regime. You can click the image below to watch the rather lively debate (I begin at around the 8:00 min mark). I want to take the opportunity, though, to frame my views on this subject a little more fully than I was able to on air.

The Obama administration has organized the most restrictive multilateral sanctions regime in Iranian history as part of a larger strategy which has proven to be about as successful as one could hope. While the human suffering in Iran is real and tragic, sanctions are hardly the sole culprit. The Iranian government has demonstrated incompetent management of their economic and healthcare systems for decades. Sanctions have contributed to this mismanagement to be sure, but the restrictions are a result of the Iranian government’s unwillingness to live up to their responsibilities to the international community. The terminal  goal of sanctions is not to spread misery, it is to advance a multifaceted strategy aimed at:

  • Isolating the government, banks, and companies in Iran from export, commercial, and diplomatic ties
  • Containing their ability to project destabilizing regional influence that would be at odds with US interests
  • Destabilizing the government and economy through denying access to foreign currency reserves, foreign direct investment, and oil refining capacity
  • Gaining leverage for the United States and its allies to bring Iran to the bargaining table and put them in a position where they are highly incentivized to accept limits on their nuclear program and to meet international compliance and monitoring obligations
  • Motivating the Iranian middle class, and perhaps more importantly, the influential Iranian business class to get off the bench and realize that continued support for the extant regime in Tehran will only lead to privation and isolation

Objective analysis reveals that by these standards, the current policy has been quite successful. There are those who contend that pure diplomacy is the answer, but that was the Obama Administration’s first move. It was, in fact, Tehran’s rejection of Obama’s attempted “diplomatic opening” that convinced many of America’s ambivalent allies that sanctions were the best option. For those who wisely believe a military attack on Iran to be a very bad course likely to lead to many unintended consequences, the current sanctions and containment regime continues to be the most appealing policy.

Update: Nima Shirazi – who blogs at http://www.wideasleepinamerica.com/ - pointed out that during this segment I refer to an “Iranian nuclear weapons program.” I should make clear that it is my view,  one shared by US and Israeli intelligence assessments, that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapons program and has not made a decision to actively pursue the creation of a nuclear weapon. Their continued enrichment would, though,  make it easier and faster for them to develop a weapons program if they decide to and is a prerequisite for doing so. In fact, the difference between developing a nuclear weapon and merely having a “nuclear weapons capability” is the crucial distinction between the US and Israeli declared red lines. In the end, the only way for the international community to understand with confidence the true nature of the Iranian nuclear program is for Tehran to agree to full-access and transparent international monitoring.